A heated debate recently among Wisconsin sports fans has surrounded the contract situation of Milwaukee Brewers’ star first baseman, Prince Fielder. Fielder will be in the second year of a two-year, $18 million contract in 2010. Following the 2010 season, Prince will be arbitration eligible one more time before becoming a free agent in 2012.

The contract question will continue to linger because as time passes, Fielder’s trade value decreases as he gets closer to free agency. Many feel, probably Brewers’ General Manager Doug Melvin included, that the team needs to discuss the prospects of a long-term contract with Fielder’s representation now. But the chances of such a deal are long at best, as agent Scott Boras is known for rarely allowing his clients’ free agent years to be bought out. Boras’ tactic: let all 30 teams bid when the player becomes a free agent rather than accepting the current team’s bid against nobody.
Whether or not it is feasible for the Brewers to convince the Fielder/Boras tandem to make a deal before 2011 ends is anyone’s guess — but an educated guess would assume no, unless the Brewers really showed them the money. But can the Brewers show Prince the money? How much can they actually afford to offer one player?
Below is an estimate of the Brewers player salary situation from 2010 through 2015. The figures are based on published salary amounts for the players, and does not take into account performance bonuses. Yovanni Gallardo’s 2010 salary is an estimate and Corey Hart’s contract is assuming he loses his arbitration case on Thursday. Also, the Brewers are still on the hook for $7.15M to Bill Hall and $1.4M in total buyouts for Braden Looper and David Weathers (not represented in the chart below).

Milwaukee Brewers Salaries
Position Players
One thing working in the Brewers’ favor are young/cheap position players. Casey McGehee will not be arbitration eligible until 2012, while Alcides Escobar will not be eligible until the 2013 season. Depending on when Mat Gamel makes the big leagues for good, he will not hit arbitration until 2013 or later. So the left half of the infield will be cheap for at least the next two/three seasons. Rickie Weeks and Corey Hart have another year of arbitration eligibility before becoming free agents in 2012 (the same time as Prince). But the Brewers have minor leaguers who could potentially replace the pair by 2012 (Brett Lawrie, Lorenzo Cain, among others) and offer cheap 2B and RF alternatives without losing much talent-wise.
Center field is a question mark heading into 2010. Carlos Gomez was part of the J.J. Hardy trade and should, presumably, get most of the playing time in center. Jim Edmonds may be a platoon option if Gomez falters. Should Gomez succeed and project as the Brewers CF of the future, he will be arbitration eligible the next two seasons before becoming a free agent in 2013.
Ryan Braun is the surest bet the Brewers have all the way through 2015 with the contract he signed in 2008, and provides the lineup with superstar punch with or without Prince in the mix. And the catcher position will likely be filled by a young prospect (Lucroy/Salome) in the next year or two.
Pitchers
The pitching is a different story, as the team tries to recover from a couple bad contracts (Jeff Suppan and David Riske). Pitching has also been hurt by a lack of home grown talent. Only Gallardo, Manny Parra and Mitch Stetter were drafted by the Brewers — whereas there will be at least 5 home-grown position players (likely more) on the opening day roster. Home-grown, and guys with low service time in general, are a team’s cheapest options because their contracts are team controlled for six years. Thus the reason Yovanni will be making about $425K versus Suppan’s $12.5M. Free agency allows all 30 teams to offer, and the sky is the limit when a player hits the open market.
A lot will be riding on the young pitchers for the Brewers — especially in the minor league system. Gallardo and Parra will be arbitration eligible next season (2011), possibly leaving the Brewers without any “pre-arbitration” pitchers on their staff, aside from Stetter. By our estimates, the Brewers have already invested over $50M to pitchers in 2010 — almost 2/3 of their payroll. Without the development of young arms, or trades to bring them in, the Brewers will have to continue investing a great majority of their payroll in pitching. And that would leave a Prince contract out of the question.
The Verdict
Theoretically, the Brewers should not have a problem paying Prince in 2011, his last year of arbitration, if he is not traded before then. The Brewers will see $24.15M come off the books between Suppan, Hall and Riske alone ($2.25M in buyouts will need to be paid).
But we would be remiss if we did not mention that several players will receive raises in 2011, including Braun, Davis (team option), and others through arbitration. And depending on how 2010 goes, Yovanni could receive a substantial raise for 2011 through arbitration.
The Brewers won’t want to wait until the middle of the 2011 season to trade Prince. He is too valuable on the open market, and would presumably net the Brewers some of the young pitchers they need to fill out the pitching staff for the future if they trade him before the 2011 season. However, if the Brewers feel really good about the young pitchers they have coming in 2011/2012 and beyond, maybe they feel confident that a strong offer can be made to Fielder and Boras. Nevertheless, it will likely take over $20M/year, meaning committing over 25% of the annual payroll to one player. And the contract length Boras would request likely makes the risk even higher for a small market team like the Brewers.
To say the least, if Prince Fielder is deemed unaffordable for the Brewers the hole at first base would be significant. But the hole in the payroll could be more significant if he is signed, and it would leave Doug Melvin with zero margin for error when signing other players. So while the Brewers might have the ability to offer Prince a “signable” long-term contract now — it is unlikely they will take the ultimate risk and actually present it.
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